RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREES

If a husband and wife, resident in one state, go to a second state for a
divorce, recognition of the divorce is governed by the full faith and
credit clause.' If, however, the couple go to another country for their
divorce, the solutions fashioned by the full faith and credit clause
are inapplicable; recognition of this divorce is determined by the policies
and standards of the home state.2 There is need for fresh consideration
of these policies and standards, with an eye toward answering the question, when should the home state of one of the spouses3 recognize an
international participating4 divorce as dissolving the couple's marital
status. 5
1 See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 228 (1945); Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 294, 303 (1942).
2 See Christopher v. Christopher, 198 Ga. 361, 31 S.E.2d 818 (1944); Rosenbaum v.
Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 (1955); Gould v. Gould, 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N.E.
490 (1923).
3 Normally the state concerned with the couple's status, and the state where the
question of the divorce's validity will arise, is their state of domicile. It is not inevitable,
however, that the forum will or must be the domiciliary state. If the couple were
resident in the forum state for a year or more before obtaining their international
divorce, but were not yet domiciliaries there, its interest in the couple's status is at
least as great as the interest of the state of domicile and it would seem reasonable for
it to apply its own standard of validity. The interest of the forum arises from the
effect of the divorce on the community and the state's social and moral expectations
regarding marriage, and these interests are determined more by residence than by the
technical factor of domicile.
4 "Participating" refers to the appearance in the divorce proceeding of both parties,
either in person or by their attorneys. This comment will consider only participating
divorces, though the approach suggested here might be applicable to ex parte divorces.
Although this discussion usually assumes that the divorce being reviewed is a "consent"
divorce (where both parties want the divorce and one spouse sues the other as a matter
of convenience rather than ill-will) the discussion applies equally to contested divorces.
5 The question is limited to the dissolution of status because although the fixing
of alimony, the awarding of custody of the children or the distribution of property by
the foreign court may create problems, one cannot reach these problems until he has
decided the initial question of whether the parties are still married.
Although the question of status is a necessary starting point for all discussions,
questions regarding other incidents of divorce, such as alimony, property distribution, and child custody, need not depend on the outcome of the status issue. "[A]
severance of issues is reasonable and sensible when the interests relevant to each are
centered at different places .... " Leflar, ConstitutionalLimits on Free Choice of Law,
28 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 706, 728 (1963). It has been recognized that a marriage is
divisible; that is, that a decree of divorce may affect one aspect of marriage without
affecting others. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948); Rheinstein, Domicile as Jurisdictional
Basis of Divorce Decrees, 23 CONN. B.J. 280, 294-95 (1949). The "divisibility" of divorce
has also been recognized in most state statutes through the requirement that if one
spouse obtains a divorce because the other is mentally ill and institutionalized, an
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A brief outline of the approaches of courts which have confronted
this question will provide a useful frame of reference. Courts generally
regard the question as limited to whether the divorcing court acquired
jurisdiction,6 an approach similar to that used with interstate divorces. 7
If the divorcing court assumed jurisdiction under circumstances acceptable to the local forum, the divorce will be recognized. 8 The plethora
of possible circumstances can be examined satisfactorily for our purposes
by examining the two general categories, "mail-order" divorces and all
other kinds.
There is almost universal antipathy to "mail-order" divorces. 9 To
obtain one each spouse need only execute a power of attorney directing
a Mexican lawyer to represent him in a divorce proceeding. This is deposited in the corner mail box and soon a divorce valid in Mexico is
returned. The reaction of the New York Court of Appeals to these
divorces is typical: "There is not even the slightest semblance or color
of jurisdiction justifying action by a court. The spouses have never submitted themselves to nor invoked the jurisdiction of a court of the foreign nation as we understand those terms .... Their collusive agreement

and conduct may not be the foundation for the creation of any rights."' 0
Although mail-order divorces have been effective to limit or destroy cer12
tain rights," they will not support a second marriage by either spouse.
obligation of support remains in the spouse obtaining the divorce. Dissolution of the
marital status does not dissolve the obligation arising out of that status. It seems
reasonable to apply this principle to international divorces. The interests and policies
relevant to status should be independent of those relevant to its derivative obligations
and recognition of the foreign court's adjudication of status need not affect these
derivative concerns.
6 See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 166-67 (1895); Wood v. Wood, 41 Misc. 2d
95, 104, 245 N.Y.S.2d 800, 811 (Sup. Ct. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 22 App. Div. 2d
660, 253 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1964), aff'd, (N.Y. July 12, 1965) in N.Y. Times, July 13, 1965,
p. 20 (city ed.); EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 57, at 207, § 58, at 209 (1962) (hereafter cited as EHRENZWFiG).
7 See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 232 (1945); Thompson v.
Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873); Martens v. Martens, 260 App. Div. 30, 32, 20
N.Y.S.2d 206, 209, rev'd on other grounds,284 N.Y. 363, 31 N.E.2d 489 (1940).
8 Cf. Scott v. Scott, 51 Cal. 2d 249, 331 P.2d 641 (1958); Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 21
App. Div. 2d 635, 253 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1964), aff'd, (N.Y. July 12, 1965) in N.Y. Times, July
13, 1965, p. 20 (city ed.); Hansen v. Hansen, 255 App. Div. 1016, 8 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1938);
EHRENZWEIG, § 58, at 209.
9 See, e.g., Magner v. Hobby, 215 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 919
(1955); United States v. Snyder, 177 F.2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1949); In re Cohen, 10 N.J. 601,
93 A.2d 4 (1952); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60 (1948).
10 Caldwell v. Caldwell, supra note 9, at 150, 81 N.E.2d at 62-63.
11 Mail-order divorces have been effective to deny a widow her statutory share in her
husband's estate, In re Rathscheck's Estate, 300 N.Y. 346, 90 N.E.2d 887 (1950); In re
Raleigh's Estate, 22 Misc. 2d 705, 204 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Surf. Ct. 1960), to bar a compensation claim, Unruh v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Ariz. 118, 301 P.2d 1029 (1956), and to
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The second step in the examination is twofold because New York's
approach differs from that of other states. New York courts have upheld
nearly all international* divorces other than mail-order divorces. 13 New
York's judicial policy toward foreign divorces has been sweepingly declared to be that "New York courts customarily give full recognition to
divorces granted in other states and countries even where the ground,
the domicile, or other prerequisites, singly or together, are found to be
such that they would be held insufficient towards securing a New York
decree after a trial taking place here."' 14 The sweep of this policy, though
apparent in other cases, 15 is clearest in the Mexican divorce cases with
which New York courts are preoccupied today.16 These typically involve
a visit to Mexico of a day or two by one spouse, with an appearance in
the proceeding by the other spouse through an attorney. Invariably the
divorce is granted on grounds not available in the home state.
The Court of Appeals recently affirmed this policy in its first decision on
17
the validity of Mexican divorces.
In contrast, the few cases considering international divorces in other
states seem to transpose the interstate jurisdictional requirement of
domicile' 8 to international divorces, and if neither spouse was domiciled
estop "private claims," Considine v. Rawl, 39 Misc. 2d 1021, 242 N.Y.S.2d 456 (Sup. Ct.
1963); Dorn v. Dor, 202 Misc. 1057, 112 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Sup. Ct. 1952), affd, 282 App.
Div. 597, 126 N.Y.S.2d 713 (1953); but see Magner v. Hobby, 215 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 919 (1955).
12 See cases cited supra note 9.
13 But see MacPherson v. MacPherson, 1 Misc. 2d 1049, 149 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct.
1956); Molnar v. Molnar, 131 N.Y.S.2d 120 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
14 Leviton v. Leviton, 6 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 (Sup. Ct.), modified on other grounds, 254
App. Div. 670,4 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1938).
15 For instance, in Oettgen v. Oettgen, 196 Misc. 937, 94 N.Y.S.2d 168 (Sup. Ct. 1949),
a German couple obtained a divorce in Germany after being resident in New York
for over a year and after the wife had declared her intention to become an American
citizen. The court seized on the nationality of the couple and the fact that they were
married in Germany to uphold the validity of the divorce.
16 It is estimated that 250,000 New Yorkers have obtained Mexican divorces. N.Y.
Times, March 10, 1965, p. 39M, col. 3.
17 Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel (N.Y. July 12, 1965), in N.Y. Times, July 13, 1965, p. 20
(city ed.). All of the judges were acutely aware of, and influenced by, the problems
which retroactive invalidation of bilateral Mexican divorces would present for 250,000
New York residents. The majority's solution was to validate such divorces, holding that
"domicile is not intrinsically an indispensable prerequisite to jurisdiction ....
" Id. at
p. 20, col. 3. Vigorous dissents disputed the majority statement that "recognition as a
matter of comity offends no public policy of this state." Id. at p. 20, col. 4. The dissenters' analysis and their tactic of solving the practical difficulties by holding such
divorces invalid, but only prospectively, would seem a better approach to the problem.
18 "mudicial power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking--is founded on
domicil." Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945). See RESTATMENT
(SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 110, 111, 113 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953).
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in the foreign country the divorce will not be recognized. For example,
in the Ohio case of Bobala v. Bobala'9 the husband went to Bravos,
Mexico, to obtain a divorce. It is not clear from the report how long
he stayed in Bravos, but the court found that he had not established
a "bona fide residence" in Mexico and concluded that "in that event no
jurisdiction attached to that court to grant a decree, and if that be true
appellee [the wife] has not been divorced as the decree would be void
ab initio . . . even though the parties appeared in the Mexican court
and consented to that court exercising jurisdiction ....-20 The almost

automatic transposition of the interstate requirement of domicile into
international divorces is vividly shown in the California case of Scott v.
Scott.2 1 In this case there was substantial evidence that the husband, who
obtained the Mexican divorce, had established a domicile of choice in
Mexico. Even though the existence of domicile or a "bona fide residence"
was irrelevant to the Mexican court, 22 the court applied the "general
rule . . . that where a party has established a bona fide residence in

Mexico and obtained a Mexican decree of divorce, such decree is entitled
to full faith and credit in California .... ,,23

But past results are of only limited value for future decisions. Guidance for future cases should be sought in the policies which should
underlie those results. Some of the policies thought to support recognition of foreign decrees are embraced in the term "comity." 24 Recognition is frequently extended because comity is said to "require" recog68 Ohio App. 63, 33 N.E.2d 845, 20 Ohio Op. 45 (1940).
Id. at 70-71, 33 N.E.2d at 849, 20 Ohio Op. at 48.
21 51 Cal. 2d 249, 331 P.2d 641 (1958). Although the divorce in this case was ex parte,
the approach of the court presents such a good example of the practice of the courts
that it has been included here.
22 See Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 43 Misc. 2d 462, 471, 474, 251 N.Y.S.2d 565, 575, 577
(Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 21 App. Div. 2d 635, 253 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1964), aff'd,
(N.Y. July 12, 1965) in N.Y. Times, July 13, 1965, p. 20 (city ed.).
23 51 Cal. 2d at 253, 331 P.2d at 643.
24 The classic statement on the meaning of comity is found in Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895): "'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But
it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international
duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws." Mr. Justice Cardozo viewed interstate comity as
more compelling, saying that it requires that courts "do not close their doors unless
help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception
of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal." Loucks v. Standard
Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918). It seems agreed that recognition
of a foreign judgment is limited by the "public policy" of the forum, see, e.g., Strawn
Mercantile Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 279 S.W. 473, 474 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); 16 Am.
Jut. 2D Conflict of Laws § 6 (1964), but this is not always evident in the results of
cases.
19

20
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nition, not unlike the recognition required of an interstate divorce by the
full faith and credit clause. But comity does not command, it persuades.5
No authority requires a state to recognize any international decree; it
does so only because recognition is in its interest.2 6 Although the term
"comity" may once have emphasized this point, its current use obscures
or obliterates it; further use of the term should be avoided.
Although "choice of law" and recognition of international decrees
present different problems, learning derived from the former may aid
in the solution of the latter. An approach finding increasing application
in cases involving choice of law questions is the "interest analysis. '27
Using this analysis, when the facts of a case are such that the laws of both
the forum and at least one other jurisdiction seem to apply2s the court
looks behind the seemingly applicable decisions and statutes to determine
their underlying policies, thereby determining the interest of each jurisdiction in having its law control the issue. If this examination indicates
that only one jurisdiction is in fact interested, its law is applied. If, on
the other hand, both jurisdictions are interested and their interests conflict, two approaches have been suggested. In the first, the court weighs
the various interests and applies the law of the jurisdiction having the
overriding interest. 29 In the second, the court re-examines the policies
underlying the forum's statutes, defining them with "moderation and
restraint" to see if conflict can be avoided. 30 If this re-examination shows
that a clash of interests is unavoidable, the court applies its own law,
for "it is no part of the duty of a court to subordinate domestic interests to those of a foreign state." 31
25 Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900).
26 "Private international law and the law of conflicts extend recognition to foreign
statutes or judgments by rules developed by a free forum as a matter of enlightened
self-interest." Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution,
45 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 30 (1945). See Rheinstein, The ConstitutionalBases of Jurisdiction,

22 U. Cm. L. REv. 775, 801 (1955).
27 The "interest analysis" has been largely developed in recent years by Professor
Brainerd Currie. For a compilation of some of his articles see CumuE, SELECTED EssAYs
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
The approach has, at the very least, been used in contracts cases, Bernkrant v. Fowler,

55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961) (Traynor, J.); Lilienthal v.
Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543 (Ore. Sup. Ct. 1964) (spendthrift trust), and tort cases, Griffith
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
28 There may be cases in which the forum has no interest in the case. The special
problems presented by such a situation are not germane to this discussion and are not
considered here. See generally Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 754 (1963).
29 See, e.g., Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLum. L. REV.

959 (1952).
30 See Currie, supra note 28, at 757.
31 Id. at 758.
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A similar analysis seems an appropriate first step for questions of
recognition. The emphasis of the interest analysis is on the policies
behind the laws. Advancement of these policies seems more likely if the
court asks what the forum state's interests are and how recognition of
the international decree will affect them rather than whether the
divorcing court had "jurisdiction."
But extension of the interest analysis to questions of recognition is
not sufficient. If possible, determining whether an international divorce
will or will not be recognized should be fairly simple in order to facilitate making the determination and to give the couple obtaining the
divorce some certainty in their marital status.32 The interest analysis
alone cannot satisfy this desideratum. The process of examining the facts
and interests involved in each case is complicated, and the couple could
not be sure of their status until the courts of their home state have completed the complex calculus necessary to reach a decision. More importantly, if a conflict of interests between the state and the divorcing
country appears, when the court weighs the relevant interests or reconsiders its own interests with an eye to avoiding conflict, the state's
interests might be subordinated to those of the divorcing country. 33 This

is neither necessary nor desirable. Some modification of the analysis
seems expedient.
The focal point of the court's examination should be the state's interest in the maintenance or dissolution of the marital status. The
interests of the divorcing country are only peripherally relevant. Unless
they tend to ameliorate the probable impact of the foreign divorce on
the local community or similarly indicate that the state's interests are not
as broad as they might have appeared at first,34 they need not be con-

sidered, because the court's concern is to determine and protect the
35
state's interests and not those of the foreign country.
Certainty, if desirable in any field of law, seems particularly desirable
in family law. A rule-of-thumb based on and implementing relevant
32 "If there is one thing that the people are entitled to expect from their lawmakers,
it is rules of law that will enable individuals to tell people whether they are married
and, if so, to whom." Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 553 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
33 The forum's interests are obviously frustrated if the court "weighs" interests and
decides in favor of the foreign jurisdiction's interests. Even if the second approach is
used, and the forum reconsiders its interests "with restraint," the process invites consideration of local interests in terms of the foreign interests and therefore creates the
possibility that the forum's interests will be subordinated in order to avoid a conflict.
34 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 45, 48-49 infra.
33 This approach is a change from Professor Currie's, see text accompanying note 30
supra, but a necessary one, see note 33 supra. The state's interests are better protected
if they are the focus of the court's concern than they would be if they were moderated
in light of the foreign interests.
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interests but not requiring their discovery and assessment in each case
would provide this. The details of such a rule may have to be worked out
independently by each of the states because the divorce laws and their
underlying policies vary widely among them, but a general approach
can be sketched here.
The first step in its development is a consideration of the interests of
the state. These are discovered by examining the state's laws and the
reasons underlying them. If a law designed to apply to a situation can
be ignored with impunity it will cease to determine the conduct at which
it is directed. This law may be just as effectively undermined if it can
be by-passed by resort to other jurisdictions. A couple could not obtain
a local divorce without satisfying the minimum requirements of the
state's statutes. Should a divorce which would not satisfy these minimum requirements be effective because obtained in another country?386
The answer depends on whether the foreign divorce undermines the
state's laws. This, in turn, depends on the reasons for these laws.
Divorce statutes contain requirements as to time37 and cause. A time
requirement may serve either as a condition precedent to filing 8 or as
a waiting period between a preliminary and final decree.8 9 Such a requirement as a prerequisite for filing, measured from the establishment
of domicile, seems designed to assure a link between the couple and the
40
state substantial enough to justify the state's acting on their petition
and to reduce the burden on the courts. If the foreign country grants the
couple a divorce on a ground recognized by the couple's home state, the
resulting divorce cannot be said to have offended these interests of the
state. Indeed, the foreign divorce may have furthered the state's interests
by reducing the burden on its courts. The purpose of the post-filing
86 Professor Ehrenzweig approaches this question by suggesting that international
divorces should be recognized unless contrary to "natural justice." EHRENZWEIG § 73, at
245, 248. Unless we know what is meant by "natural justice," however, this suggestion
is not helpful.
37 Time, not domicile, is relevant here. "Domicile" is future-oriented, indicating a
state's interest in the parties' status because some aspect of that status will be connected
with the state in the future; e.g., if one or both of the parties will live or remarry in
the state. "Time" indicates also a prior relationship between the state and the couple.
The statutes require both aspects.
38 Most states require a time period of one year: e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 128; Mich.
STAT. ANN. § 25.89 (Supp. 1963); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458:5 (1955); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-97 (1960). Other time requirements range from five years, MAss. LAw ANN. ch. 208,
§ 5 (1955), to six weeks, IDAHO CODE, § 52-701 (1963); NEV. REV. STAT. tit. 11, § 125.020
(1963).
39 See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 132; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 139 (1952) and LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 9-302 (1965), where a wait of one year is required.
40 Cf. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel (N.Y. July 12, 1965) in N.Y. Times, July 13, 1965, p.
20, cols. 5, 6 (city ed.) (dissenting opinions); Rheinstein, Book Review, 8 J. PuB. L. 551,
555-56 (1959).
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waiting period may be the reduction of the burden on the courts, the
provision of a "cooling off" and reconciliation period in which the parties may reconsider their decision, or the punishment of the offending
party by restricting his freedom to remarry. 41 If it is either of the latter
two, the requirement may be as substantive a part of the divorce process
as proof of a ground for divorce. If the integrity of the state's laws
is undermined by a foreign divorce obtained on less rigorous substantive
grounds, a foreign divorce which fails to satisfy the post-filing time requirement also undermines it.
A state imposes minimum substantive requirements for divorce because the likelihood of achieving what the community expects of mar42
riage is thought to be lessened if marriage is too easily dissolved. If
people could successfully bypass the state's divorce laws, the effectiveness
of the state's social judgments about marriage, in the form of its standards for the dissolution of marriage, would depend upon the proximity
43
of jurisdictions with "lower" standards and the mobility of its citizens.
When these judgments are embodied in a statute, courts should treat
their circumvention as severely as they would their breach. 44 The state's
concern with the integrity of its laws dictates as a minimum that the
state not recognize an international divorce obtained in circumstances
where the state's interests are undermined.
But what are those circumstances? Presumably the community's policies are not frustrated if the parties have withdrawn from the community.
The more common case, however, is at the other extreme-the Mexican
41 It is sometimes difficult to determine whether the period after the entering of a
decree is designed as a "cooling off" and reconciliation period or as a period of
punishment to the "offending" party, but in either case the effect is to deny one or
both of the parties freedom to remarry. Cf. Rheinstein, supra note 40, at 555.
42 Evidence of this may be found in the experience of the Soviet Union. For a
period immediately following the revolution it was possible to obtain a divorce by
merely leaving one's spouse. Such an action could be registered for evidentiary purposes but was not necessary to validate the divorce. Current procedure, however, is
strict and divorce is difficult to obtain. See Address by Professor Rheinstein, February
29, 1952, in UNIvERsrrY oF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, CONFERENCE ON DIvoRcE.
43 "The courts of the nations whose laws are most lax upon this subject will be constantly resorted to for the purpose of procuring divorces; and thus . . . the common
cause of morality and religion [will] be seriously injured, and conjugal virtue and
parental affection become corrupted and debased." STORY, CONFLICr OF LAWS § 225 (8th
ed. 1883), synthesizing opinions in FERGUSSON, REPORTS ON DIvoRCES (1817). Mr. Justice
Frankfurter referred to this as "Gresham's Law of domestic relations." Sherrer v.
Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 367 (1948) (dissenting opinion). See Rheinstein, Domicile as
JurisdictionalBasis of Divorce Decrees,23 CONN. B.J. 280, 296 (1949).
44 Courts may decline to enforce statutory policies because they believe them to be
outmoded. But even though the divorce laws of a number of states would benefit
from re-evaluation and modernization (with New York's, N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 170,
and New Jersey's, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2 (1952), being notable examples) this is a
job for the states' legislatures and not the courts.
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divorce, in which one of the parties leaves the state for only a few days
and the other not at all. 45 The continuity of residence plus the less rigorous grounds on which the divorce is granted require a finding that the
state's interests would be trenched upon by recognition of these divorces.
Suppose the couple had been absent from the state for a protracted
period of time and obtained their divorce on grounds not recognized by
their home state. The couple might have returned to the home state
within weeks of obtaining their divorce, or waited years before returning. In either case their extended residence in the divorcing country
reasonably formed a basis for an interest in their status by that country.
It would seem that the recognition of such a divorce would not jeopardize
the state's expectations regarding marriage when the couple was divorced
by a jurisdiction with which they had a reasonable connection. Some
substantial connection with the community and lack of connection with
the foreign country seem necessary to support a finding that the state's
interests would be undermined by recognizing the divorce. Several years'
absence, whether the couple return immediately or after several more
years, would not support such a finding. It is more difficult to determine
whether the state's interests are subverted when the absence ig somewhere
between days and years. For instance, assume a case where the couple
were resident in the divorcing country as the result of an indefinite
business assignment. Ten months after arriving in the country they obtain a divorce not available in their home state and are then called home.
Is this a case where the state's policies are jeopardized? A finding either
way would be reasonable. Perhaps because a court must try to protect the
state's interest, a finding that its policies are jeopardized would appear at
first to be preferable, but it is not a necessary result in this case. It is in
this type of case that the short-comings of the interest analysis become
most apparent. Because a court might reasonably reach one of two
opposite conclusions, the couple could not be sure of their status unless
and until the question were litigated. And the difficulties in application
45 The facts of a recent New York case, Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel (N.Y. July 12, 1965)
in N.Y. Times, July 13, 1965, p. 20 (city ed.), are illustrative. The husband and wife,
anxious to get divorced as quickly as possible, and either unwilling or unable to prove
the adultery of one of them, decided to get a Mexican divorce. Because the husband
was about to take a business trip to the West, it was decided he would stop in Juarez
while away. The wife completed the arrangements after her husband had left on his
trip, and mailed his instructions to him. He entered Juarez one morning, met his
lawyer, and signed the Municipal Register of Juarez, thereby establishing his residence
for divorce purposes. He then attested to the accuracy of a complaint drawn in a
language he could not understand and returned to Texas to resume his trip. He had
spent about an hour in Juarez. The next day an attorney, acting under a power of
attorney executed by the wife in New York and mailed to Juarez, appeared before the
court and submitted the wife to the court's jurisdiction. The divorce, valid in Mexico,
was granted that day.
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of the analysis for the court are dear. It is in these difficult cases that a
rule-of-thumb is most appropriate.
Certain observations suggest the form that a rule might assume. First,
once a couple decides on divorce they probably desire to obtain it as
quickly and easily as possible, with a minimum of cost and notoriety and
a maximum of certainty. There is probably a high correspondence between this desire and the procurement of international divorces which
offend state policies. Secondly, the undermining of its interests could
not be eliminated totally even if no international divorces were recognized, because a couple can always obtain an unassailable participating
divorce in Nevada in six weeks. 46 Finally, most international divorces
seem to be obtained in no more than a few weeks.
A rule that all international divorces obtained in six weeks or less on
grounds not available in the home state are contrary to public policy and
will not be recognized would virtually eliminate the subversion of the
state's domestic relations policies through divorce. The Nevada alternative should be more attractive than an international divorce of more than
six weeks because of speed, convenience, probable cost, and certainty
of the decree's validity if the validity of an over-six-weeks international
decree is doubtful.4 7 For most people these considerations will be decisive
and the number of international divorces obtained in more than six
weeks will probably be de minimis.
This rule alone, however, does not determine whether in the hypothetical case above the court should recognize the divorce obtained after ten
months in the divorcing country. In such cases the length of absence alone
is not determinative. For instance, if the couple in the hypothetical case
had known of their imminent return when they obtained the divorce, or
if a socialite were to loll at an exotic resort for ten months while avoiding
the state's divorce laws, the offense to the state's interests seems much
dearer than in the hypothetical. The difference lies not in the length
46 See Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343
(1948). A state may still be able to assail a participating divorce in a bigamy prosecution, but except for this remote possibility there seems to be no way in which an interstate participating divorce may be attacked. See EHRENZWEIG, § 74, at 253; Sumner,
Full Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees-Present Doctrine and Possible Changes,
9 VAND. L. R.r'v. 1, 9 (1955).
Without the protection of the full faith and credit clause the six week participating
divorce would probably be invalid in most states. Cf. Bobala v. Bobala, 68 Ohio App.
63, 33 N.E.2d 845, 20 Ohio Op. 45 (1940) (7 week Mexican divorce); EHRENZWExG § 77,
at 259 n.13 (ex parte six week Nevada divorces overturned for lack of domicile in sixteen
states and the District of Columbia).
47 Although certainty is an often-espoused goal, there may be instances when uncertainty is desirable. Courts might choose to curb the undermining of the state's
policies via international divorce by leaving uncertain the recognition of such decrees.
Such -uncertainty would discourage parties from utilizing the device.
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of absence, but in the intent of the parties obtaining the divorce to return
shortly to their home state. When the divorce is obtained abroad during
an absence of more than six weeks, the crucial factor is this intent to
return in the very near future. Although the state has an interest in
seeing its divorce laws applied to people who have been and will continue
to be its citizens, an intention to return to the home state at some indefinite time in the future does not sustain the necessary nexus. An
intention to return at some definite time, known when the divorce is
obtained, does.
But the definiteness of the couple's plans is not the sole criterion. Even
if the couple know they will return at a certain date, if that date is sufficiently distant from the date of their departure their intent becomes
irrelevant. The state's interest in governing the marital relationships of
individuals decreases in direct proportion to the length of their absence
from the state. A period of absence beyond which no divorce will be
deemed to undermine the state's policies regardless of the intent of the
couple is required. In determining the period, it should be borne in
mind that the couple are spending this time in another country whose
social and economic standards might be quite different. The move might
involve a major change in their way of living. After a year's absence 48
it is difficult to infer that the primary purpose of the move was to obtain
a divorce not available in this country, or that the community is still
interested in regulating the marital behavior of these individuals. Also, a
year in the divorcing country would seem to establish an interest in the
couple on the part of the foreign country sufficiently strong to sustain the
49
divorcing court's action.
After identifying divorces whose effect is to subvert the state's interests
and determining their treatment, the question remains, what of other
decrees? Should they all be recognized? No state save New York5° does
so, but the above discussion indicates that they should. These other
48 A year's absence is used for illustration. A legislature may decide that six months
or some other period is more appropriate.
49 See Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel (N.Y. July 12, 1965) in N.Y. Times, July 13, 1965, p.
20, cols. 5, 6 (city ed.) (dissenting opinions).
50 New York courts are a poor example, however, for they recognize all divorces without regard to any of the reasons discussed here. They evidently feel the necessity to
ameliorate what they and many others regard as bad legislative policy. The only
ground for divorce in New York is adultery. N.Y. DoM. RE.L. LAw § 170. The New
York divorce statute has remained basically unchanged on this point since 1787. See

David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205 Misc. 856, 839-40, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649, 651-52 (Sup. Ct.
1954). Yet, despite this continuing expression of legislative policy. New York courts
have consistently refused, if both spouses appeared in the action, to deny recognition

to international divorces, rtgardless of the circumstances surrounding the divorce,
except in cases involving mail-order divorces. See text accompanying notes 14-17 supra.
The reason for this distinction is not clear, for mail-order divorces are not the only
international divorces which jeopardize New York's interests.
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divorces are those obtained on grounds recognized by the home state or
obtained during an absence of more than six weeks if the couple did not
intend to return to the home state within a determined period of up to,
for example, one year. In these instances, no interests of the home state
are trenched upon by the international divorce and therefore recognition
should follow in furtherance of the friendly respect for foreign judgments
symbolized by the term "comity."
There remains the question of who may attack the validity of the
international divorce. A state court cannot permit spouses or third
parties to attack collaterally the validity of a participating interstate
divorce,5 1 for to do so would be to assert "a power which cannot be
reconciled with the requirements of due faith and credit." 52 But the

compulsion of full faith and credit is absent where international divorces
are concerned. Local policy is the yardstick of recognition in such cases
and requires that collateral attack of the decree by either spouses or third
parties be allowed. If the foreign adjudication of status offends state
interests, review of the decree should not be foreclosed.
This conclusion can be supported in two ways. It has been said that

"an action for divorce... is not an action between the parties alone; ...

there are three parties involved, the husband and the wife who represent
their respective interests, and the state protecting the morals of the community to see that neither by collusion nor connivance the status of
marriage will be reduced to a matter of temporary convenience." 53 The
state is not a party to the marriage, but it does have an interest which
a court should recognize when it determines the status of residents of
the state. Because the state was not before the divorcing court, its interest in the couple's status has not yet been litigated. Once the question
is raised, by whomever it is raised, the court should be free to examine
the circumstances under which the divorce was obtained and to determine
the state's interest. But it is not necessary to employ the fiction that the
state is a "party" to the proceedings in order to permit the collateral
attack of the foreign decree. The state's concern for the integrity of its
laws and the need to regulate the domestic relations of its citizens are
paramount. They cannot be left to the couple to determine; yet, to precude collateral attack would be to do just that. To assure that its interests are protected, the state must open its courts for collateral attack,
even by one of the parties who subsequently changes his mind.
Estoppel as a defense to such an attack is dealt with in the same
51 Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343
(1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
52 Sherrer v. Sherrer, supra note 51, at 355.
53 Kegley v. Kegley, 16 Cal. App. 2d 216, 219-20, 60 P.2d 482, 484 (Dist. Ct. App.
1936).
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manner. "Realistically seen, an action for divorce is . . . a petition for

restoration to the freedom of remarriage ...."54 The result of a collateral
attack is a determination that that freedom was or was not properly"
granted. If only the parties are affected by this determination, there is
no equitable basis for denying the estoppel defense; but as was demonstrated above, the state also has an interest in the parties' status, so that
estoppel should not be permitted to foreclose attack. There are, however,
cases in which the interests of third parties affected by this determination
must be considered. For instance, if the international divorce was followed by another marriage and children were born of the second marriage, the court must consider whether bigamy, illegitimacy, or loss of
support might result from a refusal to recognize the divorce. If so, it
may be more in the state's interest to preclude attack on the divorce
through estoppel than to invalidate the divorce. Although use of estoppel
may validate in practice a divorce that would otherwise be invalid, it
does not preclude the question from being decided differently in another
suit if the facts warrant it. Estoppel should only be used where denying
effect to the international divorce would clearly endanger other social
policies of the state.
Should an international participating divorce obtained under standards
less rigorous than the state's be effective? It should be, unless it offends
the state's interests. Recalling the previous discussion, the following rule
seems appropriate for determining when the state's interests are subverted: any international participating divorce is invalid if obtained
during an absence of six weeks or less under lower substantive standards
than those permissible in the state; such divorces granted during an
absence of more than six weeks but less than a year are invalid if the
parties intended to return within a year of their departure. 55
Adoption of this rule would be an advancement in several respects.
Current practice has polarized into undesirable extremes, with New York
courts largely disregarding relevant legislative policy and other courts
tending to ignore relevant interests of the state by unduly narrowing
their concern. Founding the proposal on the interests of the state seems
more likely to implement all policies than either of the current approaches. The complexity of adjudication and uncertainty of marital
status that could result from considering multiple interests is avoided
by the formulation of the rule. Using intent as the determinative factor
in over-six-weeks cases produces some uncertainty, but the state's interests may be most effectively protected by maintaining some uncertainty
54 Rheinstein, Book Review, 8 J. PUB. L. 551, 555 (1959).
55 But see note 48 supra.
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here.56 At any rate, there is less uncertainty with this rule than if the
controlling factor were domicile and the loss of certainty that might occur
in New York would seem to be more in New York's interest than the
certainty that now exists.
The perseverance and ingenuity of couples anxious to be divorced
probably precludes a final solution to the problem of evasion of state
divorce laws by international divorces, but the rule offered here should
substantially ameliorate it. It seems likely that in almost every case in
which a couple wants a divorce they cannot obtain in their home state,
the proposed standard will be sufficient to deter application to the courts
of another country and to protect the integrity of the state's laws. In
this manner the undermining of the state's policies can be kept to that
irreducible minimum caused by interstate divorces, which "is part of the
price of our federal system." 57
56 See note 47 supra.
57 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S.
287, 302 (1942).

